From the preface to the first edition of Critique of Pure Reason:
It is true that Abbot Terrasson tells us that if the size of a book were measured not by the number of its pages but by the time required to understand it, then we could say about many books that they would be much shorter if they were not so short. On the other hand, if we are concerned with the [distinctness and] comprehensibility of a voluminous whole of speculative cognition that yet coheres in one principle, then we could just as legitimately say that many books would have turned out much more distinct if they had not been intended to be quite so distinct [that is, “clear” in the popular sense — plenty of examples, etc.] For the aids to distinctness, while helpful in parts of a book, are often distracting in the book as a whole. They keep the reader from arriving quickly enough at an overview of the whole; and with all their bright colors they do cover up and conceal the articulation or structure of the system, even though that structure is what matters most if we are to be able to judge the system’s unity and sturdiness.
It amazes me that Kant was able to foresee the problems with Zizek’s body of work so perfectly.