Although I am convinced of the importance of Zizek’s intellectual project, I believe that his style of argumentation holds him back. The fundamental lack of organization of nearly all of his writings is of course a huge problem — the man cannot resist an aside or digression, even if it’s literally in the middle of a sentence already underway and interrupts the syntax in a weird way. A deeper issue in my view is the fact that he so seldom seems to argue for his position in any straightforward way. I don’t want to do the analytic fetishization of argument, but my recent reading of Gabriel and Meillassoux has convinced me that it is underused — and it’s clearly better than the two primary ways Zizek tends to support his claims, namely:
- “This is what [Lacan or an German Idealist philosopher] really said, which is of course a radicalization of [previous German Idealist philosopher, or Descartes].”
- Relying on the appeal of the counter-intuitive: “IS NOT this position, which absolutely flies in the face of common sense, precisely the most obvious thing in the world?!”
Again, I don’t think that straightforward chains of logical deductions are the only way to present ideas — I have basically never written anything that procedes in that way, for instance. I also understand how a dialectical thinker might push at the boundaries of comprehensibility, focus on contradictions and stunning reversals, etc. But still.
An und für sich 
You say: “Again, I don’t think that straightforward chains of logical deductions are the only way to present ideas — I have basically never written anything that procedes in that way, for instance.”
But few analytic philosophers really done that in the literal sense. A very standard move is “set ’em up and knock ’em down,” wherein a plausible non-strawperson position is set up (and maybe called the standard view) and the the flaws that are found it in, according to the author, point in some way, to a better view. Sure, analytics use write in ways that pay more homage to the deductive ideal (Larry Wright’s phrase), but there is strong dialectical substructure to many papers in analytic philosophy.
I haven’t read Meillassoux much, but when I have time (HA) I’ll try again.
I have been guilty of something like the first, where the person occupying the role of Lacan or a german idealist is Anscombe and no radicalization is necessary, because obviously once we understand Anscombe we’ll understand the truth.
I like this article on a common non-argumentative way of proceeding in philosophy.
Do you read Lenin’s Tomb, Kotsko? Have you read what Seymour has written lately of some of Zizek’s stuff?
link: http://leninology.blogspot.com/2010/10/more-chocolate-laxative.html
Ben, Surely someone with that many initials could never be wrong!
Jake, I did read that post and think it makes sense — it’s not really a debate I feel very invested in, though.
“Ben, Surely someone with that many initials could never be wrong!”
Counterpoint: P.M.S. Hacker.
Though I notice that G.W.F. Hegel and F.W.J. Schelling both fit. Hacker could get an exception due to having ridiculous initials.
I think what annoys me the most about Zizek’s style is what it ultimately could have been vs what it actually is as such – clearly the man has more talents then most and could probable craft a solid sentence here and there (even in a foreign language), but a lot of this stuff reads like a first draft, a thinking-aloud dictation – imagine how much more thought-provoking the stuff would have been if he actually sat down and edited it a bit? It’s as if he really does not care for the final product, which very well might be the case, but then why bother with books as a form at all…
I read your post about how his books tend to be “self-assemble.” I know that when I finished my book, I felt like I had arranged everything in the intended way and even briefly entertained the fantasy of being a kind of co-author/editor for his future work. I now wouldn’t make such exclusive claims for my book and I don’t think being Zizek Jr. is a career path I’d want, but I think the general idea is valid: the man needs an editor.
Of course, ideally the publisher would provide something on that front. What I’m now wondering is if he may have had more forceful editors at Verso and especially Duke (where Tarrying, his best-assembled book in my view, came out) — perhaps moving to a new publisher for his “serious” books when he was already a Big Name meant that the new editors were afraid to push back at all, while Verso was reluctant to further damage the relationship. (The big test case here would be On Belief, by a for-profit publisher that had a series whose entire premise was just recruiting Big Names for quick-and-dirty titles — it’s so poorly put together that it literally repeats the same multiple-paragraph passage in two places.) And of course there’s been a general trend in the industry away from having strong editors anyway.
I know that I am supposed to dislike or disagree with Hacker but I don’t know why! It is a disorienting position to be in.
Yeah, that last book put me over the edge a bit with its ultimate lack of organization.
I think in the end though if he is happy with his books (not in a self-indulgent kind of way, but just satisfied), no pressure or editor might salvage the situation, you know? He’s in that place where he can write or do as he pleases, maybe it’s a kind of revenge against the strict rules of the academia?
The now defunct (alas!) blog Vulgar Marxism had a superb parody of Zizek during the soccer World Cup, in which he was ‘interviewed’ by two Aussie commentators about the tournament. I’d give the link to it, but it’s no longer there on the VM site.
Oh Zizek’s so desperately in need of a good editor.. I gather from gossip that the first drafts are even more of a shambles…
I think the second argumentative strategy you mentioned (which can bring some stunning insights, true) is one of his more annoying tics, because sometimes he’s setting up some rarified theoretical truism (usually deconstructively influenced postcolonial, feminist or queer) and then reversing, so what you get is warmed over common sense.
This ties into my larger reservation about his work which is probably somewhere near Lenin’s, the critique of multiculturalism, capitalism as niche etc (which is true enough) isn’t supplemented with any real solidarity with or sympathy for race, gender, sexuality struggles. Not only does it ring a bit false, like he really just wants to brush away those things and get back to Important Things, more damningly it leaves him without a means to talk about the way that capitalist oppression’s often really highly predictable in racialised and gendered ways. Like when in The Borrowed Kettle he says “we’re all potentially homo sacer now” well yes, but it’s a pretty easy guess who’s most likely to be..
(the opposite problem with someone like Butler, of course, is that she doesn’t have much of a theory of economy).
here’s a thought, i think it might be that a lot of what is perceived as amateurish editing on Z’s part is due to the fact that he is writing in the analysand/analyst frame. he intentionally meanders, he doesn’t want to act as the big other. but maybe i am giving him too much credit…it may be this AND the fact that he is occasionally just sloppy. i dunno.
but to queenemily: i share your reservations re: his relationship to queer/postcolonial academia but i feel he is right. and it took me sometime to articulate why i feel this way, but ultimately, i think he views race, gender, and sexuality as a subtext of capitalism…so it isn’t the case as you say, “capitalist oppression’s often really highly predictable in racialised and gendered ways”–it might be for a particular era or in a particular region but it is not constant and never has been or will be and that is because without capitalism you would not have said assemblages of race, gender and sexuality. so i think a couple ways he thinks it is redundant and counterproductive to think of them in their own right. the second and more important reason they are redundant is that of course there is no other, which makes identity politics a misnomer, completely redundant. to the effect that, “there is no sexual relationship”. this is fictitious and as we work over identity categories, we congeal them, so really i think this is an ontological point. there simply is no small other. this prevents us from taking responsibility for ourselves. so for what it is worth…just a side note. cheers.
Oh yes, I understand and agree with the ontological point about those categories being produced by capitalism, but one can very easily point to the fictionality of these categories whilst recognising the ways in which they function to structure social life. And I think Zizek fails to do this.
It’s not really hard to read an anxious subtext in Zizek (and Badiou’s) work on that, where the necessary critique of the deconstructive respect for the Other slips into the nostalgic desire for Real Philosophy – you know, when it was just white dudes. I think Zizek theoretically others all kinds of groups, treating them polemically *as* ontological unities eg the way he uses “postcolonial scholars” as a straw man to bat about…
I have reservations in parts obviously, but I do agree with Adam about the importance of what he’s doing.
@j:
“here’s a thought, i think it might be that a lot of what is perceived as amateurish editing on Z’s part is due to the fact that he is writing in the analysand/analyst frame. he intentionally meanders, he doesn’t want to act as the big other. but maybe i am giving him too much credit…it may be this AND the fact that he is occasionally just sloppy. i dunno.”
I don’t think this is a fruitful hermeneutical technique.
@queenemily
I was under the impression that Zizek frames his critique of multiculturalism/feminism/postmodernism Leftism as a critique of common sense, not the other way around.
queenemily: so in re: to “but one can very easily point to the fictionality of these categories whilst recognising the ways in which they function to structure social life. And I think Zizek fails to do this,”–i guess it is hard for me to understand what you mean by this since Z is constantly writing on/coming to the defense of the absolutely most oppressed people of the world–i am thinking of the palestinians, to some extent the iranians, the maoist farmer/rebels in India, the people of the flavelas, etc.—it seems he has a very real and concrete understanding and even empathy with this suffering.
so is this just a general sentiment you maintain? “it’s not really hard to read an anxious subtext in Zizek (and Badiou’s) work”–i ask only b/c i think there are many who share this generalized feeling about his work. i think the same sort of anxiety or whatever you are describing, could be sensed coming from the doxa of what can be called cultural studies, postcolonial st., queer theory–a kind of desperation, perhaps? you know this, kind of condescending attitude and willingness to write him off b/c he represents, old white dudes doing philosophy. only Z claims he is representing his ideology while cult st. folks believe they are beyond this, there is no ideology. in other words, i don’t think he would deny that ontology is truth and specifically that of Badiou and others. that there is a claim to be made to universality. i think he is blatantly saying, that philosophy is better at doing what cult. studies attempts to. he is not denying that and seems to happily admit this. i guess i need evidence to be convinced that he makes a straw man of postcolonial studies and others, others, as you say. i just don’t see it.
i actually think he is incredibly (and admittedly, weirdly) sensitive and tender in dealing with matters of suffering and human rights. i get that more from the videos and lectures i have seen, not his books. and this is coming from someone who is queer and feminist. i find him to be more of a feminist than most feminist theorists i have read. strange.
bryan: i wonder what you mean. i don’t know that he is attempting to make a hermeneutical critique. or even if that is the standard we are aiming for in garnering something from his work. maybe you could elaborate.
I was excited to see that someone noted this. I am not opposed to varying ways to present an argument, but I think Zizek can go too far with his digressions sometimes. Other times his digressions contribute to the argument in an incredibly interesting way. Often his digressions and asides cause difficulty in the overall understanding of the argument he intends to present. This I think is why I have not gotten into his philosophy as much as I have into someone like Deleuze or Kant.